IBEW TCC-2 2018 Verizon Proxy Recommendations
1 | Election of Directors | |
Archambeau | CEO MetricStream | Against |
M. Bertolini | CEO Aetna | Against |
R. Carrion | CEO Popular, Inc. | Against |
M. Healy | Fmr. Group President Proctor & Gamble | Against |
M. F. Keeth | Fmr. EVP Royal Dutch Shell | Against |
L. McAdam | CEO Verizon Communication, Inc. | Against |
C. Otis, Jr. | Fmr. CEO Darden Restaurants | Against |
R. Slater | Partner, Squire Patton Boggs LLP | Against |
K. Tesija | Fmr. EVP Target Corp. | Against |
G. Wasson | Fmr. CEO Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. | Against |
G. Weaver | Fmr. CEO Deloitte & Touche LLP | Against |
2 | Ratification of Appointment of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm | For |
3 | Advisory Vote to Approve Executive Compensation | Against |
4 | Special Shareholder Meeting Allows investors to accelerate change at a company, without the need to wait for the next annual meeting to restructure a Board of Directors or make other changes. | For |
5 | Lobbying Activities Report We believe in full disclosure of Verizon Communication Inc.’s direct and indirect lobbying activities and expenditures. | For |
6 | Independent Chair When the CEO serves as Chairman, this arrangement may hinder the ability of the Board to monitor the CEO’s performance and to provide the CEO with objective feedback and guidance. | For |
7 | Report on Cyber Security and Data Privacy We believe it is advisable for the Board to explore integrating cyber security and data privacy metrics into executive compensation. | For |
8 | Executive Compensation Clawback Policy Recent high profile payouts underscore the need for a stronger Executive Compensation Clawback Policy. At companies like Verizon, where the vast majority of senior executive compensation is tied to financial performance, we believe incentives not to take undue risks to boost short-term profitability are appropriate. | For |
9 | Nonqualified Savings Plan Earnings Above market earnings on non-qualified accounts are not performance-based and thus do nothing to align management incentives with long-term shareholder interests. In addition, gross disparities between retirement benefits offered to senior executives and other employees risk potential moral problems and risk to corporate reputation. | For |